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THE WAIVER OF IMMUNITY IN THE EQUAL
ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT: CLARIFYING OPAQUE
LANGUAGE
In enacting the Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980 (EAJA or Act),1
Congress recognized that the disparity of resources between the United
States and other parties often creates a formidable barrier that deters parties
from vindicating their rights against the government. 2 The EAJA sought to
minimize that deterrent by providing for the award of attorneys' fees to
prevailing litigants. 3 Section 2412(b) of the Act provides that " It]he United
States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any
other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any
statute which specifically provides for such an award."' 4 This provision
waives governmental immunity5 that exists in common law and statutory
exceptions6 to the traditional "American rule" that each party pays its own
litigation expenses. 7
1. Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325-30 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504
(1982), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982)).
2. Id. at tit. II, § 202.
3. Id. at §§ 202-204. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) awards fees to prevailing parties other than the United
States in actions by or against the government.
4. Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, § 204, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982). This Comment is limited to
interpreting the waiver of immunity with regard to other fee-shifting statutes and does not discuss the
United States' liability under the common law. See, e.g., Trustees for Alaska v. Watt, 556 F. Supp. 171
(D. Alaska 1983) (common benefit claim denied).
5. The doctrine of sovereign immunity means that the United States cannot be sued by name
without its consent. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for
Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH.
L. REv. 387, 392 (1970). Traditionally, courts have held that waivers of sovereign immunity are to be
construed strictly. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 (1983). When waivers
measure the liability of the United States in terms of that of anotherparty, however, courts have liberally
interpreted the waivers. See infra notes 159-71 and accompanying text.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982).
7. The United States is the only common law country in which the losing party in litigation does not
automatically pay the attorneys' fees of the winner. Zemans, Fee Shifting and the Implementation of
Public Policy, 47 LAW & CoNEmp. PROBS. 187, 188-89 (1984). The traditional American rule is that
each party pays the costs of its counsel, absent a contractual obligation, statute, or common law
exception. Note, Award of Attorneys' Fees to Nonprevailing Parties Under the Clean Air Act-
Ruckelsh~us v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983), 59 WASH. L. REv. 585, 586-87 (1984). The rule,
stemming from Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796), was reaffirmed in Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,263 (1975). Alyeska held that the common law exceptions
were limited to actions taken in bad faith and those which create a "common benefit." Id. at 245.
Alyeska also held that the courts could not create a new common law exception by shifting fees when
litigation produced broad societal advantages. Id. at 269.
In the last two decades, however, congressional policy has promoted "fee shifting"-passing the
costs of litigation to the losing party by carving out statutory exceptions to the "American rule." At
present, there are approximately 140 such federal provisions. See Federal Statutes Authorizing the
Award of Attorneys' Fees, ATr'Y FEE AWARDS REP., Apr. 1985, 2, 2-3. Most of these provisions were
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Recently, courts have interpreted the government's liability for fee
awards when section 2412(b) is used in conjunction with the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (section 1988).8 Section 1988 autho-
rizes attorneys' fees when, inter alia, federal constitutional or statutory
rights are violated by officials acting under color of state law. 9 In relating
the two statutes, the majority of courts has read section 2412(b) narrowly.
These courts hold that the United States is liable for attorneys' fees under
sections 2412(b) and 1988 only when federal officials act under color of
state law. 10 The minority has found the United States liable when federal
officials engage in the same activity for which state officials would be liable
under section 1988.11
This Comment first summarizes the relevant statutes and key judicial
opinions in the section 2412(b) controversy. It then analyzes the disputed
text, the impact of alternative textual interpretations on the EAJA as a
whole, congressional intent as revealed by the Act's legislative history, and
the potential limitations created by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
This Comment argues that the text of the Act creates a presumption that
section 2412(b) imposes liability for attorneys' fees on the United States
when the government commits an act which would impose such liability on
another party. None of the other factors analyzed rebut the presumption;
rather, they tend to support it. This Comment concludes that the minority
solution to the section 2412(b) puzzle is correct but lacks a rationale
applicable across the circuits and the broad range of federal fee-shifting
enacted in response to Alyeska. Note, Will the Sun Rise Again for the Equal Access to Justice Act?, 48
BROOKLYN L. REv. 265, 272 (1982). See generally Alyeska, 421 U.S. 240 at 247-62 (history of the
American rule and its exceptions); Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1984) (entire
issue); Robertson & Fowler. Recovering Attorneys' Fees from the Government Under the Equal Access
toJusticeAct, 56 Tul. L. Rev. 903,909-12 (1982); Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A
Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 651.
8. Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)).
9. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
10. E.g., Premachandra v. Mitts (PremachandraII), 753 F.2d 635,637, 641 n.7 (8th Cir. 1985) (en
banc): Unification Church v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 762 F.2d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir.
1985); Holbrook v. Pitt, 748 F.2d 1168, 1177 (7th Cir. 1984); Lauritzen v. Lehman, 736 F.2d 550, 559
(9th Cir. 1984); Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 589 F. Supp. 921, 924-26
(N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd and vacated in part on other grounds, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985); Venus v.
Goodman, 556 F. Supp. 514, 521-22 (W.D. Wis. 1983).
11. E.g., Premachandra v. Mitts (Premachandra 1), 727 F.2d 717, 723-30 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd.
753 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, 1114 (2d Cir. 1984) (dicta);
Trujillo v. Heckler (Trujillo 1), 587 F. Supp. 928, 931-32 (D. Colo. 1984), appeal docketed, No.
84-2104 (10th Cir. Aug. 7, 1984); Local 3-98, Int'l Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Donovan,
580 F. Supp. 714, 716 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (dicta); Clemente v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 1150, 1171
(C.D. Cal. 1983), vacated in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 766 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1985); Krodel
v. Young, 576 F. Supp. 390, 395 n.6 (D.D.C. 1983) (dicta), aff'd, 748 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 62 (1985).
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provisions. It therefore offers guidelines for insuring that future interpreta-
tions of the waiver provision in relation to other federal fee-shifting statutes
neither constrict nor expand the intended scope of section 2412(b).
I. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
A. Equal Access to Justice Act
Although the sponsors of the EAJA were concerned primarily with the
problems of small businesses in contesting unwarranted government inter-
ference, 12 the EAJA's broadly worded preamble applies to any individual,
partnership, corporation, or other organization seeking review of or de-
fending against unreasonable governmental action in a civil suit or admin-
istrative proceeding. 13 Congress found that the expenses of litigation might
deter such parties from vindicating their rights against the government and
that the greater resources and expertise of the United States justified a
departure from the American rule against fee shifting. 14 Accordingly, the
Act was designed to ease the litigation burden by providing for attorneys'
fees awards in specified circumstances to parties who prevail against the
government.
Congress accomplished this goal by amending section 2412, which had
permitted courts to award costs to a private party that prevailed against the
United States, but prohibited awards for attorneys' fees. 15 As amended,
section 2412(a) continues to allow awards for costs, while section 2412(b)
authorizes awards of attorneys' fees. 16 Both subsections are permanent
12. The EAJA comprises Title II of the Small Business Export Expansion Act of 1980. See supra
note 1. The EAJA was added by a floor amendment to H.R. 5612, which was enacted as the Small
Business Export Expansion Act of 1980. The provisions of the amendment were almost the same as S.
265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), which had been passed overwhelmingly by the Senate and was
reported favorably by the House Judiciary Committee. See generally Robertson & Fowler, supra note 7,
at 905 n. 11. This Comment will cite committee reports on S. 265 as part of the legislative history of the
EAJA. Accord, e.g., Premachandra 1l, 753 F.2d at 639; H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4984 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.].
13. Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. H, 94 Stat. 2325, 2325.
14. Id.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(1982) provides as follows:
Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable fees and expenses of
attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant to subsection (a), to the
prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency and any
official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of
such action. The United States shall be liable for such fees to the same extent as any other party
would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically
provides for such an award.
219
Washington Law Review Vol. 61:217, 1986
parts of the Act, and both provide for discretionary awards. Neither
provision contains restrictions as to parties or size of awards. 17
For a three-year experimental period, section 2412(d) of the Act autho-
rized mandatory fee awards to prevailing parties, other than the United
States. 18 A parallel provision, section 504, permitted fee shifting in adver-
sarial administrative adjudications. 19 Unlike section 2412(b), both of these
sections provided for fee awards only when the position of the United States
or its agency was not found to be "substantially justified" and when there
were no "special circumstances" which would make an award unjust. 20
Although sections 2412(d) and 504 were repealed, they have been re-
instated retroactively. 21
Congress enacted Senate Bill 265 as the EAJA after extensive considera-
tion of various fee-shifting bills. 22 The testimony before House and Senate
committees, as well as floor debate, heavily emphasized the need to relieve
small businesses from overbearing governmental regulation through provi-
sions subsequently enacted as sections 504 and 2412(d). 23 There was
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a), (b) (1982).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1982). Section 2412(d) excluded from eligibility individuals whose net
worth exceeded $1,000,000 and businesses or organizations whose net worth exceeded $5,000,000. It
also limited the net worth of eligible parties and the hourly rates for fee awards. Id. In addition, it
restricted fee awards to civil judicial proceedings for actions "other than cases sounding in tort." Id.
Congress, however, explicitly indicated its intent to remove constitutional torts from the exception.
H.R. REp., supra note 12, at 18. Accord, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge Parish
School Bd., 679 F.2d 64, 68 (5th Cir. 1982).
19. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982). Section 504 restricted fee awards to adversarial adjudications-those
in which the position of the United States is represented by counsel. It excluded licensing and ratesetting
adjudications. Id. at § 504(b)(1)(C). The legislative history also explicitly excluded social security
administration proceedings. E.g., H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 12; see H. Conf. Rep. No. 1434, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5003, 5012 [hereinafter
cited as Conf. Rep.]. Further, § 504 excluded individuals whose net worth exceeded $1,000,000 and
businesses or organizations whose net worth exceeded $5,000,000. It also limited the hourly rate for fee
awards. 5 U.S.C § 504(b) (1982).
20. The "substantial justification" qualification presented a formidable barrier to fee awards.
During the year ending June 30, 1984, federal courts denied 120 fee petitions. Almost three-quarters of
these were denied because the courts found the position of the United States to be substantially justified.
1984 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
93 (1984).
21. Since Congress viewed §§ 504 and 2412(d) as major departures from traditional American
practice in which each litigant pays its own fees, it provided for their automatic repeal on October 1,
1984. In 1984, the President vetoed a bill that would have reinstated §§ 2412(d) and 504 as permanent
legislation. Memorandum of Disapproval, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1814 (Nov. 8, 1984). On
August 5, 1985, §§ 504 and 2412(d) were permanently enacted. Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183.
22. Congress had been considering fee-shifting legislation for seven years. H.R. REP., supra note
12, at 6-8.
23. See generally Award of Attorneys' Fees Against the Federal Government: Hearings on S. 265
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Adminstration of Justice of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Hearings]; EqualAccess to
Justice Act of 1979, S. 265: Hearings on S. 265 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
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virtually no mention of section 2412(b), with the exception of the testi-
mony of Armand Derfner, the representative of the Lawyers Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law and the American Civil Liberties Union.24 Derfner
noted that proposed fee-shifting legislation was intended to put the United
States on a par with other parties. 25 He pointed out that the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 provides for fee awards against state
and local governments for section 1983 violations. The pending bills,
however, only authorized fee awards against the United States when private
parties would be liable.26 Referring to one of the pending bills, Derfner
suggested changing "private parties" to "other litigants" to effectuate the
committee's intent.27
B. Sections 1988 and 1983
Section 2412(b) of the EAJA is a referential statute that potentially
provides for a fee award based on any federal fee-shifting provision. With a
single exception, 28 however, all reported section 2412(b) litigation refers to
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (section 1988). This
statute authorizes discretionary awards of reasonable attorneys' fees to
prevailing parties, other than the United States.29 Courts may make such
awards in "any action or proceeding" to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986, as well as two other enactments. 30
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Sen. Hearings].
24. Armand Derfner testified before a House subcommittee hearing on S. 265 and other pending
fee-shifting bills. In the course of that testimony, Derfner suggested changing "private parties" to
"other litigants." He pointed out that § 1988 provides for fee awards against state and local govern-
ments for § 1983 violations, but the pending bills only authorized fee awards against the United States
when private parties would be liable. His proposed modification would help to put the United States "on
a par with other governmental bodies." H.R. Hearings, supra note 23, at 100. Although the subcom-
mittee proffered no explanation, the next draft of S. 265 contained the language which was enacted:
"The United States shall be liable. . . to the same extent that any other party would be liable ....
28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982).
25. H.R. Hearings, supra note 23, at 100.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See infra note 117.
29. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), courts have little discretion in awarding fees pursuant to
§ 1988. Fees generally are awarded to prevailing plaintiffs unless special circumstances make an award
unjust. See, e.g., Ellwest Stereo Theatre, Inc. v. Jackson, 653 E2d 954, 955 (5th Cir. 1981) ("the
discretion afforded district courts to deny attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs under § 1988 is
exceedingly narrow .... "). Fees are awarded to prevailing defendants, however, only when a suit
was brought or conducted in bad faith. E.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S 5, 15 (1980) (per curiam).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) also authorizes fee awards to enforce title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982), and title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42
U.S.C. § 2000d through d-6 (1982).
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Most of the litigation involving sections 2412(b) and 1988 implicates
section 1983.31 This statute imposes liability on persons acting under color
of state law who deprive persons of "rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws. .... "32 The sweeping language of
section 1983, coupled with expansive judicial interpretations in the 1960's
and 1970's, 33 has made section 1983 the principal statute for the protection
of civil rights. 34 Section 1983 also provides a cause of action when rights
other than civil rights have been violated. 35 The Supreme Court, however,
has made it clear that not all statutory violations can support section 1983
claims.36
II. THE COURTS' DECISIONS
The interpretative debate over section 2412(b) centers on whether the
provision defines the government's fee liability directly (the United States
is liable when it violates a provision of section 1988) or indirectly (i.e.,
United States' liability is equivalent to that of any party who, committing
the same act, would be liable for fees pursuant to section 1988). The
majority interpretation of section 2412(b) is represented by Lauritzen v.
Lehman37 and Premachandra v. Mitts (Premachandra I).38 In Pre-
machandra H, the Eighth Circuit en banc reversed the Premachandra v.
Mitts panel decision (Premachandra ),39 which held that the United States
is liable for attorneys' fees when it engages in the same conduct which
would incur liability, had it been committed by any other party. The
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
32. Id. Section 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
As used in § 1983, "color of law" is the equivalent of state action. Timson v. Weiner, 395 F. Supp.
1344, 1347 (D.C. Ohio 1975).
33. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (persons can sue government officials under
§ 1983 even when the alleged violations were not authorized by the state: state judicial remedies need
not be exhausted prior to a § 1983 action; local governments are immune from § 1983 suits), overruled
as to local government immunity, Monell v. Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
34. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 22A, at 121 (4th ed. 1983).
35. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (permitting § 1983 action for deprivation of social
security benefits).
36. See infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
37. 736 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1984).
38. 753 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
39. 727 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 753 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
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Premachandra and Lauritzen fees claims stem from constitutional viola-
tions by federal officials. The minority position, represented by Pre-
machandra I, has been extended to a fee claim based upon statutory
violations.40
A. The Majority View
In Premachandra II and Lauritzen, the courts denied attorneys' fees
requested under section 2412(b) even though plaintiffs had prevailed on
substantive claims that the federal government violated their constitutional
rights. 41 The courts found no basis for holding the United States liable for
attorneys' fees simply because it committed the same action for which a
state official would be liable. They labeled this approach one of "analogy"
and rejected it,42 holding instead that the United States must actually act
under color of state law before it can be liable under sections 2412(b),
1988, and 1983. The courts relied on the text of section 2412(b) and the
relation between sections 2412(b) and 2412(d). They also drew support
from the legislative history of section 2412(b) and from the rule that
waivers of sovereign immunity are to be construed strictly.
Both courts based their interpretation of the United States' liability for
attorneys' fees under section 2412(b) on the language, "under the terms of
any statute which specifically provides for such an award. ",43 The courts
reasoned that since plaintiffs could not allege federal governmental action
under color of state law,44 their suits did not enforce an enumerated
provision of section 1988. Since the specific terms of section 1988 were not
met and since no other attorneys' fees award statute applied, plaintiffs
could not claim a section 2412(b) attorneys' fees award. 45 The courts found
the statutory language clear and unambiguous and failed to find any
compelling reason to depart from its facial meaning.
46
40. Trujillo v. Heckler (Trujillo 1), 587 F. Supp. 928 (1984) (attorneys' fees awarded in a class
action for violations of federal statutes by the Social Security Administration).
41. Premachandra 1, 727 F.2d at 719 (alleging the Veteran's Administration violated Pre-
machandra's fifth amendment rights by refusing to grant him a pretermination hearing); Lauritzen, 736
F.2d at 552 (alleging the Navy violated Lauritzen's constitutional rights by threatening to discharge her
and by reducing her pay and rank as a result of her statements of possible homosexuality to a Navy
psychiatrist).
42. Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 636-37; Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 553-54, 557-59.
43. Premachandra 11, 753 F2d at 637; Lauritzen, 736 F2d at 553.
44. Section 1983 is the only enumerated provision of § 1988 that provides a remedy for the federal
constitutional violations that were the substance of both cases. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
45. Premachandra 1H, 753 E2d at 637; Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 553-54.
46. See Premachandra II, 753 F.2d at 637-38; Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 553-54.
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The courts also examined section 2412(b) in relation to the structure of
the EAJA as a whole. They reasoned that many of the actions for which fees
might be sought under section 2412(d) could be characterized as section
1983 constitutional or statutory violations but for the section 1983 require-
ment of state action. 47 If the analogy interpretation were followed, many
prevailing parties would claim fee awards pursuant to sections 2412(b) and
1988 to avoid denial of a section 2412(d) award when the government's
position was substantially justified. 48 According to these courts, plaintiffs'
analogy interpretation of section 2412(b) could render nugatory the restric-
tions on section 2412(d) fee awards, "swallow up" that subsection, and
thwart congressional intent for the EAJA as a whole. 49 Moreover, the
Premachandra H court dismissed as irrelevant recent Supreme Court
decisions clarifying which statutory claims may be brought under section
1983.50 Since the Premachandra II court found it "conceivable" that all
federal statutes could support section 1983 claims, it was particularly
concerned that the analogy approach would result in section 2412(b)
"swallowing up" section 2412(d).51
Both courts also found that the section 2412(b) waiver of sovereign
immunity must be strictly construed in favor of governmental immunity. 52
Since Congress failed to clearly create fee liability in section 2412(b) for
constitutional violations by federal officials acting under color of federal
law, the courts ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity mandated
resolution of doubts in the government's favor. 53
The Premachandra H and Lauritzen courts took the position that
legislative history should play virtually no role in interpreting section
2412(b). 54 They argued that even if the legislative history were considered
relevant, it would not support plaintiffs' interpretation of section 2412(b). 55
Plaintiffs had emphasized the legislative amendment implementing Ar-
mand Derfner's suggestion that public entities be included in section
2412(b).
47. Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 638; Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 557.
48. Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 638; Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 557.
49. Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 638. Although Premachandra 11 was decided after section
2412(d) had been repealed, the provision continued to apply "through final disposition of any action
commenced before the date of repeal." Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, § 204(c), 94 Stat. 2329.
50. Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 638.
51. See id. at 638-39.
52. Id. at 639; Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 555-56.
53. Premachandra I1, 753 F.2d at 641; Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 555-56.
54. Premachandra II, 753 F.2d at 638-39 (preferring to use the statutory context of § 2412(b) to
resolve ambiguities and finding "no need to resort to conjecture regarding the legislative history"):
Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 555.
55. Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 639-41; Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 554-55.
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According to the plaintiffs, this sequence of events demonstrated con-
gressional intent to expand the reach of section 2412(b). 56 Neither court
considered this evidence dispositive. Each noted that the legislative history
contained no statement of a causal link between the testimony and the
amendment. 57 In addition, the Lauritzen court reasoned that the suggested
modification merely assured that sovereign immunity would not bar a fee
award against the United States when the government is actually liable
under a substantive provision of section 1988.58 The Premachandra I court
noted the disparity between the language of Derfner's suggested modifica-
tion and the language adopted as evidence that Congress did not intend
plaintiff's construction of the statute. 59
The Lauritzen court held that Congress intended that the ultimate pur-
pose of the EAJA-to encourage private parties to contest government
action-could be accomplished through section 2412(d), rather than
through the statutory prong of section 2412(b). 60 It reasoned that the
primary purpose of section 2412(b) was simply to apply common law
exceptions to the American rule to the federal government. 6
1
Finally, Premachandra II refused to consider postenactment legislative
history in construing section 2412(b). 62 The plaintiff argued that Congress
ratified the Premachandra I panel opinion in a 1984 committee report
accompanying a bill to reenact sections 2412(d) and 504 as permanent
provisions of the EAJA. 63 That bill passed both houses of Congress, but
was not signed by the President. 64 The court reasoned that the issue before
it was the intent of the Congress that enacted the EAJA. Postenactment
history was irrelevant to that intent, and the President's refusal to sign the
bill deprived the committee report of any weight.65
B. The Minority View
A few courts66 have adopted the broader interpretation of section
2412(b): prevailing parties are entitled to attorneys' fees when the United
56. Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 639; see Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 554-55. See supra note 24.
57. Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 640; Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 555.
58. Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 556.
59. Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 640-41.
60. Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 557.
61. Id. at 554; cf. Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 641 (ruling that legislative "reluctance" to
authorize expansive fees liability mitigated against plaintiff's interpretation of § 2412(b)).
62. Premachandra II, 753 F.2d at 638.
63. Id. at 641 n.9. See infra note 156.
64. Premachandra II, 753 F.2d at 641 n.9.
65. Id.
66. See supra note 11 for courts adopting the minority position.
225
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States engages in conduct that "if carried on by any 'other party' . .
would result in assessment of attorneys' fees against that party under
§ 1988."67 The minority position, most fully explained by Premachandra
I, rejected the majority approach in which the United States would incur
liability for fees only when the federal government acted under color of
state law. The court found that limiting fee awards to a situation which
would occur so infrequently was inconsistent with the purpose, legislative
history, and text of section 2412(b). 68 In addition, the court held that its
broader view maintained a proper balance between sections 2412(b) and
2412(d) and was consistent with the rule of strict construction of a waiver of
sovereign immunity. 69
The Premachandra I court identified the disputed statutory text as "The
United States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent
that any other party would be liable" 70 and found that the language was
"relatively opaque."71 Since the statute was textually ambiguous, the court
construed it on the basis of the congressional purpose and intent revealed
by legislative history. 72 First, Premachandra I emphasized the remedial
purpose of the EAJA: to eliminate the deterrent effect of litigation expenses
and to place the federal government and civil litigants "on a completely
equal footing.' 73 According to the Premachandra I court, this purpose is
better served by making the United States liable for fees in suits analogous
to section 1983 actions than by restricting the scope of section 2412(b). 74
Second, the court found that the amendment changing "private party" to
"other party" demonstrated congressional intent to assure governmental
liability for actions by federal officials acting under color of federal law. 75
The court noted that the "clear import" of Derfner's remarks was to create
federal liability for actions vindicating federal constitutional rights, "just
as states are liable under § 1988 for fees in analogous suits against state
officials brought under § 1983."76 Third, the court pointed to legislative
history showing that Congress explicitly considered the applicability of
section 2412(b) to section 1988. 77
67. Premachandra v. Mitts (Premachandra 1), 727 F.2d 717, 724 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd., 753 F.2d
635 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
68. Id. at 725-29.
69. Id. at 729-30.
70. Id. at 725 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982)).
71. Id. at 727.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 727-28 (citing the "equal footing" language contained in H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 9).
74. Id. at 728.
75. See id. at 728-29 (The "sequence of events demonstrates Congress' intent to extend § 2412(b)
to make the United States liable for fees in suits . . . like the instant one .
76. Id.
77. Id. at 729. "[Section 2412(b)] clarifies the liability of the United States under such statutes as
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The Premachandra I court reasoned that its interpretation of section
2412(b) comported with the rule requiring strict interpretation of waivers
of sovereign immunity, although it acknowledged that the waiver could
have been drafted with "more precision and clarity." 78 It noted that the
legislative history and purpose behind the "to the same extent that any
other party would be liable" language supported a finding that the govern-
ment waived immunity.79
In addition, the Premachandra I court denied that its interpretation
would result in section 2412(b) "swallowing up" section 2412(d). 80 The
court identified the purpose of section 2412(d) as encouraging small
businesses to contest unreasonable federal agency action. 81 It viewed
section 2412(d) as "a sort of catchall provision" for federal regulatory
litigation not already covered in the Act. 82 It stated that section 2412(d) was
intended to provide potential fee awards in numerous types of suits outside
the rubric of fee claims pursuant to sections 2412(b), 1988, and 1983. 83
The court also noted that potential section 1983 actions do not encompass
violations of all federal statutes, as the government had claimed. 84 It
pointed out that in the Eighth Circuit, section 1983 provides a cause of
action only for violations of constitutional rights and those statutory rights
similar to rights protected under the fourteenth amendment. An analogy
interpretation of section 2412(b), therefore, would not "swallow up"
section 2412(d). 85
III. THE SCOPE OF SECTION 2412(b)
A. Textual Analysis of Section 2412(b)
Statutory interpretation begins with the disputed text itself.86 Although
the Civil Rights Attorneys' [sic] Fees Awards Act of 1976 .. "(quoting H.R. REP., supra note 12,
at 17). Since § 1983 is the only provision mentioned in § 1988 that differentiates between states and
private parties, "it is apparent that the amendment replacing 'private party' with 'any other party' was
aimed at section 1983."Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 562 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
78. Premachandra 1, 727 F.2d at 729.
79. Id.




84. Id. at 729-30. The government had argued that, under Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980),
§ 1983 actions encompass violations of any federal statute.
85. Id. (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1042 (1981)). Premachandral also determined that Congress intended § 2412(b) to supersede
§ 2412(d), to the extent that there is a conflict between the provisions. Id. at 730.
86. E.g., Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577,581 (1982);
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the majority courts treat the controverted sentence of section 2412(b) as if it
were clear,87 it is facially ambiguous. 88 It consists of two major clauses:
(1) The United States shall be liable for such fees and expenses
(2) to the same extent that any other party would be liable. 89
The second clause is modified by two prepositional phrases:
(1) under the common law (or)
(2) under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such
an award. 90
The majority courts appear to have interpreted the disputed sentence as if
the final phrase, "under the terms of any statute. . . ." modifies the first
clause and determines the liability of the United States. 91 Failing to find that
the United States violated an enumerated provision of section 1988, they
reasoned that no statute specifically provided for attorneys' fees; thus,
section 2412(b) did not apply.92 They concluded that section 2412(b)
authorizes a fee award against the United States only when the United
States commits an act under color of state law, violating section 1983 and
incurring liability for attorneys' fees under section 1988. 93
The majority interpretation is linguistically valid, however, only if the
second major clause is set off by two commas from the rest of the
sentence. 94 In this case there are no commas. Without commas, the qualify-
ing phrase "under the terms of any statute . . . ." refers solely to the
immediately preceding antecedent, "any other party." 95 By virtue of the
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982); J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 41
(1982); R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 110 (1975); Frankfurter,
Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV., 527, 535 (1947).
87. Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 642 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
88. Interview with Prof. Carol Stoel-Gammon, Department of Speech and Hearing Sciences,
University of Washington (July 11, 1985). Acording to Prof. Stoel-Gammon, the absence of syntactic
markers creates ambiguity in the controverted sentence: "The United States shall be liable for such fees
and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the
terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award. " 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982).
89. The phrase "to the same extent" introduces the rest of the clause and links it with the preceding
clause. Prof. Stoel-Gammon, supra note 88.
90. The second phrase contains a subordinate relative clause ("which specifically provides for such
an award"). Id.
91. This conclusion is supported by the omission of any mention of the second major clause in the
textual analyses of the Premachandra H and Lauritzen courts.
92. Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 637.
93. Id.; see Lauritzen, 736 F.2d 550, 559 (9th Cir. 1984).
94. Prof. Stoel-Gammon, supra note 88; see United States v. Pritchett, 470 F.2d 455, 459 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). In interpreting a statute, the Pritchett court noted that if Congress had intended a
controverted phrase to modify the first part of the sentence, it could have inserted a comma before the
phrase to separate it from the immediately preceding clause.
95. The last antecedent is the last word or phrase which can meaningfully be read as an antecedent.
2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.33 (Sands 4th ed. 1984).
Support for the rule that qualifying phrases refer solely to the last antecedent includes First Charter
Financial Corp. v. United States, 669 F.2d 1342, 1350 (9th Cir. 1982); Azure v. Morton, 514 F.2d 897.
228
Vol. 61:217, 1986
Equal Access to Justice Act
first two clauses and the modifying phrases, section 2412(b) defines the
United States' liability in terms of its equivalence to the liability of any
other party. 96 This interpretation means that, for example, when a federal
official violates the Constitution or a federal statute, the United States is
liable for attorneys' fees awards, just as a state actor would be liable under
section 1988 for a violation committed under color of state law.
An interpretation of the qualifying phrase as modifying the liability of
"any other party," rather than that of the United States, comports with
legal authority that linguistic principles may aid statutory interpretation,
even though other canons of construction may be suspect. 97 Such an
interpretation is neither inflexible98 nor conclusive.99 However, it creates a
rebuttable presumption in favor of the minority interpretation of section
2412(b).
The majority courts' interpretation of section 2412(b) results in the
additional analytic problem of surplus language. Courts are obligated to
interpret statutes so as to give meaning to all the language and to avoid
900 (9th Cir. 1975); Quindlen v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 482 F.2d 876, 878 (5th Cir.
1973); United States v. Pritchett, 470 F.2d 455, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1972); J. SuTHERLAND, supra, at
§ 47.33; Prof. Stoel-Gammon, supra note 88; but see United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339 (1971)
(qualifying phrase refers to all three antecedents). In Bass, the rule of the last antecedent conflicted with
Court's longstanding rule of resolving ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of lenience toward the
defendant. See id. at 348. No such rule of construction prevents application of the last antecedent rule to
the EAJA.
96. It does not appear that the majority courts could have addressed the "to the same extent that"
language and still reach their restrictive interpretation of § 2412(b). Section 2412(b) creates an
equivalence relationship between the United States and any other party when the conduct of these
parties is the same. In an uncontroverted statement, the plaintiff-appellee in Premachandra 11 had
argued that "the government becomes liable for fees when it engages in the same (not 'analogous')
conduct [as another party]. [This] creates a true parity between the federal government and 'other
parties."' Supplementary Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Dr. Bhartur N. Premachandra for Rehearing En
Banc at 15 n.22, Premachandra v. Mitts (Premachandra 11), 753 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(emphasis in original). If the equivalence relationship is grounded on conduct (i.e., behavioral, not
legal, acts), then plaintiffs' ability to allege legal acts in violation of § 1983 is irrelevant to their
§ 2412(b) fee claim. Moreover, the language of the second clause, "that any other party would be
liable," requires only hypothetical liability of some other party. If Congress had wanted the govern-
ment's liability to depend on the actual liability of another party, it would have used "is liable" rather
than "would be liable." Yet under the majority courts' interpretation of § 2412(b) fee claims based on
§§ 1988 and 1983, "the only time the federal government would be liable for the unconstitutional acts
of its officers is when those officers act in concert with a state official and thus meet the state action
requirement of § 1983." Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 643 (Gibson, 3., dissenting).
97. R. DICKERSON, supra note 86, at 227; . HutsT, supra note 86, at 57.
98. United States v. Pritchett, 470 F.2d 455,459 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (last antecedent rule not applied
where the context indicates otherwise).
99. L HuRs'r, supra note 86, at 56, and R. DIcKERsoN, supra note 86, at 228, treat rules of
language usage as presumptions rebuttable by other aspects of statutory analysis.
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surplusage. 100 Premachandra H and Lauritzen, however, failed to analyze
the second major clause. 101 The omission suggests that these courts treated
the clause as redundant or otherwise devoid of independent meaning. In
particular, the majority courts failed to give meaning to the "to the same
extent" phrase introducing the second clause. 102 The phrase implies an
equivalence relationship between the liability of the United States and that
of any other party, 103 such that statutes applicable to "any other party" are
equally applicable to the United States. 10 4 The majority courts, however,
considered only whether statutes apply directly to the United States. 105
Having failed to address fee-shifting statutes that apply indirectly to the
United States because of this equivalence relationship, these courts mis-
takenly found the United States not liable for attorneys' fees under section
2412(b).
B. Structure of the EAJA
Statutory construction depends not only on the meaning of the text in
question, but also on its relation to the statute as a whole. 106 The stricture
against surplusage demands an interpretation in which the provision in
question and other provisions in the statute all retain viable functions. 107 To
the extent that an interpretation tends to nullify section 2412(b) or any other
section of the EAJA, that interpretation is unsupportable.
1. Emasculation of Section 2412(b)
None of the courts that interpreted section 2412(b) has considered the
possibility that the majority approach so constricts section 2412(b) that it
becomes a virtual nullity. 108 The majority held that its narrow interpreta-
tion of section 2412(b) was supported by cases in which the United States
100. E.g., United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955); Co Petro Mktg. Group. Inc.
v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 680 F.2d 566, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1982). But see Posner.
Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800,812(1983).
101. See Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 637 (determining whether the terms of any statute
specifically provide for attorneys' fees); Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 553-54 ("to the same extent" clause
omitted from the description of the controverted language of § 2412(b)).
102. This language is identical to that previously enacted in statutes that waive sovereign immunity
from suit. See infra note 160.
103. Prof. Stoel-Gammon, supra note 88.
104. Id.
105. Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 637; Lauritzen, 736 R2d at 553-54.
106. See Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. Federal Power Comm'n, 420 U.S. 395, 403 (1975); J.
HURST, supra note 86, at 59; J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 95, at § 47.02; see R. DICKERSON, supra note
86, at 110.
107. See supra note 100.
108. Cf Premachandra I, 753 F.2d at 643 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the
majority interpretation is unduly restrictive).
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conspired with state officials to violate rights protected by section 1983.109
However, the conspiracy situation is so rare as to be virtually nonexis-
tent. 1 10
Further, section 2412(b) does not appear to have a significant function
with regard to any of the enumerated provisions of section 1988 other than
section 1983. Although these other provisions may impose fee liability on
the United States, 1 1 they constitute a small proportion of section 1988 fee
claims. 112 It is unlikely that Congress intended section 2412(b) to address
only these exceptional circumstances in section 1988 when it explicitly
enacted section 2412(b) with reference to section 1988,113 when it believed
that the United States should be held to the same standard in litigation as
other parties,114 and when it referred to the strong congressional movement
toward placing the government and civil litigants on an equal footing. 115
The actual use of the sedtion 2412(b) waiver in litigation and the text of
representative fee-shifting provisions reveal virtually no evidence of gov-
ernmental liability pursuant to section 2412(b) and fee-shifting provisions
other than section 1988.116 While not dispositive, these analyses suggest
that the majority interpretation is suspect because it tends to nullify a
congressional enactment. With one exception, 1 17 section 2412(b) has not
exposed the United States to liability under any federal fee provision other
than section 1988. Although actual litigation cannot be equated with
potential liability, the failure to utilize section 2412(b) with these other
provisions suggests that such liability may be limited.
Section 2412(b) has not been used in conjunction with fee provisions
other than section 1988 for several reasons. First, the section 2412(b)
109. Id. at 641 n.7 (citing Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 735
F.2d 895,899-900 (5th Cir. 1984) for § 2412(b) fee award resulting from a conspiracy between federal
and state officials).
110. Id. at 643 (Gibson, J., dissenting); telephone interview with E. Richard Larson, staff counsel
of the American Civil Liberties Union (Aug. 2, 1985).
111. E.g., Mendoza v. Blum, 560 F Supp. 284,287-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (actual violation of Title
VI).
112. Larson, supra note 110.
113. H.R. Ra., supra note 12, at 17.
114. Id. at9.
115. Id.
116. An evaluation of the potential applicabilit3' of § 2412(b) to each fee-shifting provision is
beyond the scope of this Comment. Discussion is limited to actual use of the § 2412(b) statutory waiver
and analysis of illustrative fee-shifting provisions.
117. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 589 F. Supp. 921, 927 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (attorneys' fees awarded under§ 2412(b) and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA),
33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982)), aff'd and vacated in part on other grounds, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985).
However, the use of § 2412(b) may have been unnecessary. Other courts have held that the FWCPA in
its own right authorized fees awards against the government. E.g., State Water Control Bd. v. Train, 559
F.2d 921, 923 n.12 (4th Cir. 1977).
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waiver is irrelevant to those fee provisions for which there is no right of
action against the United States. 118 Second, section 2412(b) is superfluous
when fee-shifting provisions explicitly impose fee liability on the United
States. 119 Third, section 2412(b) has no function in those provisions which
courts have interpreted as imposing fee liability on the federal government,
despite the absence of explicit statutory authorization. 120 Finally, section
2412(b) is inapplicable to those fee provisions which do not shift attorneys'
fees from the prevailing litigant to the United States. 121
2. Swallow- Up: A Non-Problem of the Minority Interpretation
The Premachandra II and Lauritzen courts feared that the plaintiffs'
analogy approach, coupled with the sweeping language of section 1983,122
would lead to many 2412(b) fee claims for federal violations of federal
statutes and the Constitution. 123 According to the courts, plaintiffs would
utilize section 2412(b) to avoid the restrictions of section 2412(d), with the
result that section 2412(b) would swallow up section 2412(d). 124
Since an attorneys' fees claim based on an analogy theory requires
federal conduct that would have resulted in 1983 liability, were it com-
mitted under color of state law, the scope of section 1983 causes of action
118. For example, the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (p) (1982), provides a right of
action when "a carrier does not comply with an order of the Adjustment Board" and authorizes
attorneys' fees only pursuant to subsection (p). Cf. Long Island R.R. Co. v. United Transportation
Union, 76 F.R.D. 16, 18-19 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (fees not allowed for subsection (q) actions). The United
States could not be a party to a subsection (p) action. Cf. Kimbrough v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.,
549 F. Supp. 169, 173 (M.D. Ala. 1982) (Amtrak is not a federal agency, but is treated as a private, for-
profit railroad in its employee relations). Thus, there is no underlying cause of action against the United
States to which the Railway Labor Act fee-shifting provision and the § 2412(b) waiver might be
applied. See also Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), (g) (1982)
(persons empowered to bring a civil action and attorneys' fees and costs, respectively).
119. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982) ("The court may
assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred
in any cahe under this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed.").
120. For example, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b) (1982), appears to require the § 2412(b) waiver because the ADEA does not explicitly create
federal liability for attorneys' fees. One court, however, found such liability implied in the language of
the ADEA itself. Krodel v. Young, 576 F. Supp. 390,394-95 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 748 F.2d 701 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 62 (1985).
121. See, e.g., Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 406 (1982); Watkins v.
Harris, 566 F. Supp. 493, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (finding that § 406 is not a fee-shifting provision, but
one that merely limits the attorneys' fees to 25% of the recovery).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) ("deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws").
123. See Premachandra H, 753 F.2d at 638; Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 557.
124. Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 638; Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 557. The allegation of swallow-up is
limited to situations in which attorneys' fees may be claimed pursuant to §§ 2412(b) and 1988. There is
no way of knowing whether the swallow-up issue exists apart from § 1988 and the FWCPA, supra note
117, since no other fee provision has been referenced in a § 2412(b) fee claim.
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profoundly influences the validity of the swallow-up argument. In address-
ing this issue, the Premachandra II court focused on Maine v. Thiboutot, 125
in which the Supreme Court held that a section 1983 cause of action was not
restricted to a violation of the Constitution or of civil fights or equal
protection laws. The Court in Thiboutot, however, did not affirmatively
define the range of federal laws which could support a section 1983
claim. 126
The Premachandra II court reasoned that its task of discerning legis-
lative intent was restricted to the law when section 2412(b) was enacted.127
According to Premachandra II, when the EAJA was passed, the Thiboutot
decision made it conceivable that all federal statutes could support section
1983 causes of action. 128 There is no evidence in the legislative history,
however, that Congress interpreted Thiboutot as broadly as did the Pre-
machandra Il court. This court erroneously attributed its gloss of Thiboutot
to the 96th Congress. It then concluded from its broad interpretation of
Thiboutot that Congress would not have enacted a section 2412(b) waiver of
immunity which would authorize fees for such a wide range of cases.
It appears that Thiboutot never created as expansive a right of action as
the Premachandra II court now claims it did. 129 Just prior to the Pre-
machandra I decision, the Supreme Court considered the scope of section
1983 in the context of a claim for attorneys' fees pursuant to section 1988.
In Smith v. Robinson, 130 the Court held that where a statute, the Education
of the Handicapped Act (EHA), provides a comprehensive enforcement
scheme and where the section 1983 constitutional claim is "virtually
identical" to the EHA claim, the EHA is the exclusive avenue for assertion
of an equal protection claim. 131 The Court denied the section 1983 claim
and a section 1988 attorneys' fees award. 132 Further, where plaintiffs
prevailed only on a non-fee claim, they were not entitled to a fee award
pursuant to their section 1983 claim.133 Apparently, the Supreme Court
found Thiboutot consistent with its holding in Smith because it did not
125. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
126. Id. at 4. In the Court's view, the question to be decided was whether the phrase "and laws"
should be limited to a subset of laws. "[T]he plain language of the statute undoubtedly embraces
respondents' claim that petitioners violated the Social Security Act . . . . [T]he § 1983 remedy
broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law."
127. Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 638.
128. Id.
129. See Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1948 (1985) (decided after Premachandra II) (citing
Thiboutot for the proposition that "[a]lthough a few § 1983 claims are based on statutory rights...
most involve much more").
130. 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984).
131. Id. at3468.
132. Id. at 3470-71.
133. Id. at 3471.
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overrule or restrict its holding in Thiboutot. Premachandra II, however,
disregarded Smith and other Supreme Court clarifications of section 1983
rights of action134 in its analysis of "swallow-up." 135
Even assuming the validity of the Premachandra II reading of Thiboutot,
not all actions against the government would give rise to section 1983
claims. 136 Contract claims, for example, generally do not implicate the
deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities necessary in a section 1983
action. 137 Similarly, the typical individual social security appeal also does
not trigger section 1983 liability. 138 Moreover, judicial review of agency
procedure in promulgating regulations usually does not support a section
1983 claim. 139 Even if these illustrative situations had involved a state
actor, none could support a section 1983 cause of action. In these cases, the
analogy approach could not result in a successful section 2412(b) fee
claim, because no other party could be liable for fees under section 1988.
Hence, prevailing litigants in such cases could claim fees only pursuant to
section 2412(d), and would be subject to all its restrictions.
The structural integrity of the EAJA is better served by the minority
interpretation of section 2412(b) than by the majority position. The minor-
ity approach avoids the virtual elimination of section 2412(b) from the
statute, while answering many of the "swallow-up" concerns. Any remain-
ing threat to the balance between sections 2412(b) and 2412(d) originally
struck by Congress can be corrected by the judicial restriction on section
2412(b) awards proposed in Part IV of this Comment.
134. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981) (0 1983 does not provide a cause of action when the federal statute violated provides its own
enforcement mechanism); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1(1981) (no § 1983
cause of action when the statute violated creates no substantive right for the benefit of the claimants).
The Premachandra H court also ignored its own decision in First Nat'l Bank v. Marquette Nat'l Bank,
636 F.2d 195, 198-99 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981) (limiting § 1983 causes of
action to violations of statutory rights similar to rights protected by the fourteenth amendment). This
Comment does not consider the limits First Nat'l Bank places on § 1983 because other circuits have not
adopted the Eighth Circuit's narrow reading of the statute. See Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 557 n.8.
135. Premachandra H, 753 F.2d at 638.
136. See id. at 643 n.l (Gibson, J., dissenting).
137. See, e.g., Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1948 (§ 1983 actions are "more analogous to tort claims for
personal injury than . . . to claims for damages to property or breach of contract."); Estey Corp. v.
Matzke, 431 F. Supp 468, 470 (N.D. I11. 1976).
138. Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 643 n. 1 (Gibson, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe overwhelming number
of social security appeals . . . is evidence of the extent to which individuals' statutory rights may be
violated without running afoul of the Constitution or § 1983. "); see generally Heaney, Why the High
Rate of Reversals in Social Security Disability Cases, 7 HAMLtNE L. REv. 1, 8-11 (1984).
139. See, e.g., Action'on Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd. (ASH 1), 699 F.2d 1209
(D.C. Cir. 1983). In ASH 1, plaintiffs attacked the adequacy of the Board's statement of purpose and
reasons for refusing to adopt certain regulations. No violations of the law were alleged. The court
awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to § 2412(d). Action on Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd.
(ASH II), 724 F.2d 211, 214-15 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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C. Congressional Intent: The Mosaic of Legislative History
The Premachandra 11 repudiation of legislative history in interpreting
section 2412(b) 140 is at odds with the Supreme Court's recent use of such
extrinsic aids. 141 Analysis of decisions of the 1981-82 Term of the Court
shows that the "plain meaning" rule 42 is dead.143 The Court examined
legislative history on every occasion calling for statutory construction. 144
Accordingly, courts interpreting section 2412(b) should give serious con-
sideration to the legislative history. In the case of this statute, however, the
legislative history does not decisively support either of the competing
interpretations of section 2412(b).
On the one hand, there is a strong argument that the totality of legislative
history favors the majority's restrictive interpretation of section 2412(b).
When analyzed as a whole, the legislative history demonstrates that Con-
gress gave little thought to section 2412(b). Testimony at House and Senate
hearings, floor debate, and even the sponsors' summaries of the bills
overwhelmingly concerned fee-shifting provisions other than section
2412(b). 145 Aside from the Derfner episode, there is virtually no evidence
that anyone considered the implications of section 2412(b). In such circum-
stances it may not be unreasonable for courts to take a conservative
approach and narrowly define the application of section 2412(b).
On the other hand, the Derfner episode is clear affirmative evidence that
Congress intended the broader, minority interpretation of section 2412(b).
The chronology of Derfner's testimony and the House Judiciary Commit-
tee's amendment of S. 265 from "a private party" to "any other party"
indicates congressional intent to expand the scope of the waiver regarding
fee-shifting statutes. Derfner specifically referred to section 1988 fee
140. See supra note 54.
141. E.g., Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577, 581-84
(1982) (legislative history used to confirm a textual interpretation or to show that Congress clearly
intended otherwise); see generally Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REv. 195 (1983).
142. Under the "plain meaning" rule, the words of a statute alone determine its meaning; judges do
not consult legislative history to ascertain the meaning of an enactment. Wald, supra note 141, at 196.
143. Id. at 195 ("When the plain meaning rhetoric is invoked, it becomes a device not for ignoring
legislative history but for shifting onto legislative history the burden of proving that the words do not
mean what they appear to say.").
144. Id. at 197 ("Not once last Term was the Supreme Court sufficiently confident of the clarity of
statutory language not to double check its meaning with the legislative history.") (emphasis in
original).
145. Two of the sponsors of S. 265, Senators Dennis DeConcini and Pete Domenici, ignored the
waiver of immunity regarding other fee-shifting provisions in prepared statements at the House
subcommittee hearings on S. 265. See H.R. Hearings, supra note 23, at 16, 24. Testimony at the House
and Senate hearings heavily emphasized the unjust effects of overbearing governmental regulation on
small businesses. See generally id. 1-129; Sen. Hearings,supra note 23, at 1-119. Similarly, floor
debate overwhelmingly concerned §§ 504 and 2412(d). 126 CONG. REc. 28,637-48 (1980).
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awards for section 1983 actions and recommended amending the pending
language in order to "put the United States completely on a par as far as the
enforcement of important constitutional and statutory rights." 146 The draft
immediately following Derfner's testimony contained the proposed
change. The Premachandra I court found that this "sequence of events"
supported its position. 147 Inferences about congressional intent arising
from amendments made in the course of passage of a bill are highly
probative. 148 Moreover, Congress explicitly stated its intention that section
2412(b) apply to section 1988.149
The Premachandra II court argued that Congress' omission of some of
Derfner's language contradicted the minority interpretation of section
2412(b). 150 The court, however, found a disparity only because it misread
the legislative history of the EAJA.
At the hearing at which Derfner testified, five fee-shifting bills similar to
S. 265 were under consideration in addition to S. 265. Derfner's use of the
terms "circumstances" and "other litigants" related to the language of the
bill his panel was discussing, H.R. 7208.151 A "circumstances" phrase
similar to the one quoted by Derfner had been part of S. 265 when it was
introduced in the Senate on January 31, 1979.152 However, the bill had been
amended prior to its introduction in the House of Representatives on
August 1, 1979 to read, "to the same extent that a private party would be
liable under . . . the terms of any statute . . . . ",153 Since "circum-
stances" was not in the version of S. 265 under consideration by the House,
146. H.R. Hearings, supra note 23, at 100.
147. Premachandra v. Mitts (Prenachandra 1), 727 F.2d 717, 729 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 753 F.2d
635 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
148. J. HURST, supra note 86, at 42-43.
149. The United States would also be liable under the same standards which govern awards against
other parties under Federal statutory exceptions, unless the statute expressly provides other-
wise. This subsection clarifies the liability of the United States under such statutes as the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, as well.
H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 17.
150. Premachandra v. Mitts (Premachandra II), 753 F.2d 635, 640-41 (8th Cir. 1985).
151. H.R. Hearings, supra note 23, at 99. H.R. 7208 provided that "a court may award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action brought by or against the United States, in those
circumstances where the court may award such fees in suits involving privateparties. " H.R. 7208, 96th
Cong. 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in H.R. Hearings. supra note 23, at 186 (emphasis added). Derfner
recommended amending that language to read, "in those circumstances where the court may award
such fees in suits involving other litigants." H.R. Hearings, supra note 23 at 100 (emphasis added).
152. S. 265, reprinted in H.R. Hearings, supra note 23, at 230-31.
153. Id. The amendment replaced the vague "circumstances" phrase with more explicit language:
"and the United States shall be liable to the same extent that a private party would be liable under the
common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award." Id. at
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there was no "omission" which would suggest a difference between Derf-
ner's intent and that of Congress. There is no meaningful difference
between Derfner's suggestion and that adopted by Congress. Congress
simply made a small linguistic change in S. 265 to effectuate Derfner's
suggestion. 154
The amendment of "private party" to "any other party," coupled with
the committee report reference to section 1988, makes it likely that Con-
gress was concerned about litigation implicating section 1983. That statute
is the only provision enumerated in section 1988 which requires differen-
tiation between private parties and states. 155 It is implausible that Congress
would have referred specifically to section 1988 and amended the text in a
way that affects only section 1983 of the provisions enumerated in section
1988, if it had intended the restrictive interpretation of section 2412(b)
advanced by the Lauritzen and Premachandra II courts.
Occasionally, postenactment legislative history may assist a court in
"completing or clarifying" an ambiguous statute. 156 Here, however,
postenactment developments are inconclusive. Although the 98th Con-
gress appeared to approve the Premachandra I interpretation of section
2412(b), the 99th Congress failed to express such approval. 157
154. Compare S. 265 as referred to the Committee on the Judiciary (S. 265, reprinted in H.R.
Hearings, supra note 23, at 312) ("aprivate party would be liable . ) (emphasis added) with S.
265 as reported out of committee. Id. at 325 ("any other party would be liable.") (emphasis added).
155. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1982); Lauritzen v. Lehman, 736 F.2d 550, 562 (9th Cir. 1984)
(Boochever, J. dissenting) (of the statutes mentioned in § 1988,only§ 1983 requires action undercolor
of state law before liability attaches).
156. R. DICKERSON, supra note 86, at 179-80; J. SuTHERLAND, supra note 95, § 48.06; cf. Heckler
v. Turner, 105 S. Ct. 1138, 1151 (1985) (subsequent congressional action clarifies Congress' intent). In
Taylor v. United States, the Third Circuit referred to a 1984 bill to reenact § 2412(d) and accompanying
committee report to clarify terminology in § 2412(d) as enacted in the EAJA. 749 F.2d 171, 173-74 (3d
Cir. 1984) ("Although the President declined to sign the bill into law, we nonetheless find its language
and legislative history to be instructive on the. . . meaning of. . . the original EAJA."). Contra,
Premachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 641 n.9; Posner, supra note 100, at 809; Wald, supra note 141, at 205.
157. In a report on a bill to replace the repealed sections of the EAJA, the House Committee on the
Judiciary stated:
[In § 2412(b)] a court is given discretion to award reasonable attorneys' fees. . . aganist [sic] the
United States to the same extent that any other party-i.e., private, public, or governmental-
may be liable under the common law or under terms of any statute which specifically provides for
such an award. See, Premachandra v. Mitts, 727 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984). The provisions was [sic]
designed to put the United States in the same position as other parties.
H.R. RE'. No. 992, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.3 (1984). The committee report on H.R. 2378, the bill
enacted to reinstate §§ 2412(d) and 504, refers to § 2412(b) but not to Premachandra I:
[A] court is given discretion to award reasonable attorneys' fees. . . against the United States to
the same extent that any other party-i.e., private, public, or governmental party-may be liable
• . . under terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award. The provision was
designed to put the United States in the same position as other parties.
H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 4 n.3 (1985).
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The arguments based on legislative history marshalled by the majority
and minority courts are not dispositive, and they tend to cancel one another.
Moreover, the internal inconsistencies in the available legislative materials
preclude reliable assessment of congressional intent. 158 In short, it appears
that Congress did not provide a clear answer to the section 2412(b)
interpretive puzzle. The courts, therefore, should rely on their analyses of
the text of section 2412(b), the structure of the Act as a whole, and the
requirements of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
D. Implications of the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
A distinct line of case law takes a liberal approach to sovereign immu-
nity. Courts consistently have given liberal interpretations to waivers of
immunity in statutes which, like section 2412(b), measure the liability of
the United States by that of other parties. 159 For example, the Federal Torts
Claims Act (FTCA) creates governmental liability for certain tortious
conduct "to the same extent as a private individual .... -160 Courts
repeatedly have favored a liberal construction of this waiver. 161 In
158. Three examples of the unreliability of the legislative history of the EAJA follow. First, in the
House committee report, the "Section-by-Section Analysis" carefully described the waiver of govern-
mental immunity with regard to existing fee-shifting statutes, see H.R. REP., supra note 12, but the
"Statement" omitted the statutory branch of the § 2412(b) waiver. Id. at 9. Second, in its statement of
the purpose of the EAJA, the conference report accorded equal status to the new exceptions to the
American rule (§ 504 and § 2412(d)) and the waiver provision (§ 2412(b)). Conf. Rep., supra note 19,
at 21 ("The purpose of the Act is to ... [provide] in specified situations for an award of attorney fees
• . . and to insure the applicability. . .of the common law and statutory exceptions to the 'American
rule' . . . .") (emphasis added). In the description of § 2412(b), however, the conference report
discussed only the common law exceptions to the American rule against fee shifting. Id. at 25.
Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 554, mistakenly relied on the description of § 2412(b) in concluding that the
"primary purpose" of § 2412(b) was to apply the common law exceptions to the American rule to the
federal government. Third, although the House committee report states that constitutional torts are not
excluded from § 2412(d), see supra, note 12, the conference report omits this crucial information and
simply states that tort actions are excluded from § 2412(d). Conf. Rep., supra note 19, at 25.
159. See generally Shaw v. Library of Congress, 747 F.2d 1469, 1479-82 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(reviewing case law relaxing strict construction of the sovereign immunity doctrine), cert. granted, 106
S. Ct. 58 (1985). Prior statutes provide a context for interpreting an enactment; they demonstrate the
values, policies, and tacit assumptions underlying the enactment in question. Cf. Kokoszka v. Belford,
417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974); R. DICKERSON, supra note 86, at 110; J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 95, at
§ 51.01.
160. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982). Section 2412(b) and § 2674 contain the identical phrase, "to the
same extent," to create a standard of liability for the United States which is equivalent to that of some
other party.
161. E.g., United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 150 (1963) (permitting FTCA suit for negligence
of federal prison staff); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 550 n.8, 553 (1951) (noting an
increasing trend in waiving sovereign immunity and holding that the United States may be impleaded as
a third-party defendant); 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION 2d § 3654, at 164 (1976). Contra, Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)
(plaintiff's military status precluded malpractice suit).
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particular, the Supreme Court upheld the right to sue under the FTCA even
when there is no private activity identical to the allegedly tortious govern-
ment action. 162 The Court rejected a literalist construction of the FTCA that
would have precluded governmental liability for activities that private
parties do not perform 63 because the "broad and just purpose" of the
statute was to treat the government and private persons equally. 164 Both the
purpose of the EAJA165 and the language creating liability in section
2412(b) 166 mirror the FTCA.
In addition, federal courts have liberally interpreted the waivers of
sovereign immunity in the Suits in Admiralty Act167 to make the govern-
ment's liability coextensive with that of private parties.168 Similarly, the
Supreme Court held that the Public Vessels Act 69 created liability for the
United States equal to that of a private shipowner.170 Finally, the District of
Columbia Circuit has liberally interpreted the waiver of immunity con-
tained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.171
The key interpretive issue in section 2412(b) is whether governmental
liability is defined directly or is equivalent to the liability of another party.
The extent of that other party's liability is not in question. Although section
2412(b) and the other statutes waiving sovereign immunity contain dif-
ferent qualifications of the liability of the other party, they all provide that
the liability of the United States shall be equivalent to that of the other
party. Judicial interpretation of the waiver of immunity in section 2412(b),
therefore, should follow the liberal approach courts have previously used in
interpreting these similar waiver provisions. 172
162. E.g., IndianTowing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1955) (suit for tortious conduct
by the Coast Guard in operating a lighthouse).
163. Id. at 64.
164. Id. at 68-69 (The Court must not as a "self-constituted guardian of the Treasury import
immunity back into a statute designed to limit it.").
165. H.R. RFP., supra note 12, at 9 (Act's purpose is to place the government and civil litigants on
"a completely equal footing").
166. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982) ("The United States shall be liable ... to the same extent that
any other party would be liable .... ").
167. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-52 (Supp. 11984).
168. E.g., Nahmeh v. United States, 267 U.S. 122,125-26 (1925); De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v.
United States, 451 E2d 140, 145-47 (5th Cir. 1971).
169. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 781-90 (Supp. 11984).
170. Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 228 (1945).
171. Shaw v. Library of Congress, 747 F2d 1469, 1475-83 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (construing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982)), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985). The court concluded that when
"Congress proclaims that the liability of the United States shall be the same as for a comparably-
situated private individual . . . the strict-construction rule poses a grave threat to effectuation of
congressional purpose .... "Id. at 1483.
172. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983), does not compel a different result.
Ruckelshaus is distinguishable because the language of the waiver of immunity in the Clean Air Act did
not measure the liability of the United States by that of another party. Id. at 682-83. Moreover, a liberal
239
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This liberal interpretation of waivers of sovereign immunity comports
with modern legal scholarship. Scholars argue that sovereign immunity
rests on the principle that litigation should not interfere with necessary
governmental activities. 173 They conclude that the doctrine should be
relaxed where a waiver of immunity fulfills the purpose of a statute and
where the waiver would not interfere with vital governmental processes. 174
Applying this reasoning to section 2412(b), the waiver of immunity should
be interpreted liberally. The expressed purpose of the EAJA, to encourage
persons to litigate their claims against the United States,175 is consistent
with the broader authorization of section 2412(b) attorneys' fees awards
advocated by the minority. Moreover, the EAJA merely permits payment of
attorneys' fees to parties prevailing in litigation against the government. It
neither creates underlying causes of action against the United States nor
authorizes specific relief. 176 Thus, a liberal interpretation of section
2412(b) does not interfere with vital governmental processes.
The majority and minority analyses of section 2412(b), however, follow
the traditional rule of strict construction of waivers of sovereign immu-
nity. 177 Traditional doctrine requires an explicit statutory waiver of immu-
nity before the United States can be subjected to monetary liability. 178
interpretation of that waiver would have awarded attorneys' fees against the United States to nonprevail-
ing parties, a radical departure from "historic fee-shifting principles and intuitive notions of fairness."
Id. at 686. "[I]fCongress intended such a novel result.., it would have said so in far plainer language
.... "Id. at 693-94. The minority interpretation of § 2412(b) creates no such qualitative change in
the law of fee-shifting. Since the § 2412(b) waiver of immunity is consistent with prior law, the
language used by Congress is sufficiently plain.
173. E.g., Cramton, supra note 5, at 397; cf Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U.S. 682, 704 (1949) (" [Ilt is one thing to provide a method by which a citizen may be compensated for
a wrong done to him by the Government. It is a far different matter to . ..restrain the Government
from acting, or to compel it to act. . . .The Government. . .cannot be stopped in its tracks by any
plaintiff who presents a disputed question of property or contract right. ").
174. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 95, at § 62.02; cf. Bank of Hemet v. United States, 643 F.2d 661,
665 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The time is long past when the bar of sovereign immunity should be preserved
through strained and hyper-technical interpretations of. . .acts of Congress.").
175. Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, 94 Stat. 2325.
176. For example, the Premachandra attorneys' fees action rested on a successful fifth amendment
claim for injunctive relief from an order to dismantle plaintiff's laboratory prior to a hearing on his
termination. Premachandra v. Mitts (Premachandra 1), 727 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 753
F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
It is possible that the majority courts' interpretation of§ 2412(b) stems from their concern about the
quantity of litigation against the United States or the propriety of injunctive relief. These may be issues
for congressional action outside the purview of the courts. If, however, it is proper for courts to address
these matters, they should do so in deciding the underlying substantive claims. They should not invoke
nonexistent bars of sovereign immunity when interpreting an attorneys' fees provision.
177. Premachandra v. Mitts (Premachandra II), 753 F.2d 635, 641 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc);
Lauritzen v. Lehman, 736 F.2d 550, 555-56 (9th Cir. 1984); Premachandra 1, 727 F.2d at 729.
178. See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 685; United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,586-88 (1941).
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Language similar to that of section 2412(b) has been construed as an
explicit waiver. 179
IV. GUIDELINES FOR INTERPRETING SECTION 2412(b)
The majority position mistakenly constricts the scope of section 2412(b)
by permitting a section 2412(b) attorneys' fees award pursuant to section
1988 only in the few cases in which the United States actually violates a
provision enumerated in section 1988. The minority holds that the United
States incurs such fees liability when it commits an act for which any other
person would be liable. This holding is consistent with the text of section
2412(b), the structure of the EAJA, and the legal context of the Act.
However, the balance struck by Premachandra I between sections 2412(b)
and 2412(d) lacked a compelling rationale. 180 It did not provide an analysis
of section 2412(b) applicable to the vast array of federal attorneys' fees
provisions. A new rationale for the minority interpretation of section
2412(b) is required, one that is valid across the circuits and the range of fee-
shifting statutes. It must determine the boundary of section 2412(b) from
the EAJA itself. This boundary should consistently permit fee awards
within clearly defined limits of section 2412(b) and disallow awards beyond
those limits.
The key to this limit should be the discretionary nature of section
2412(b) attorneys' fees awards. The fact that the terms of a referenced fee-
shifting statute have been met does not mean that a section 2412(b) award
179. Shaw v. Library of Congress, 747 F.2d 1469,1475-77 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 106 S.
Ct. 58 (1985). Shaw involved Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides, inter alia, that
"the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person" and that reasonable attorneys'
fees shall be part of costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(K) (1982). Since a private person may be liable for
interest as part of a fee award and since the provision subjects the United States to liability "the same as
a private person," the court found an express waiver of immunity from payment of interest. The waiver
was considered express even though neither the statute nor the legislative history explicitly mentioned
payment of interest. Contra, Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, 1112 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding the section
2412(b) authorization of attorneys' fees "in any civil action" insufficient to waive sovereign immunity
in habeas corpus actions). The Boudin court decided that habeas corpus actions are not entirely civil
proceedings. Id. at 1112. It found no indication of congressional intent to apply section 2412(b) to such
"unique" actions and was persuaded that their inclusion would be inconsistent with the legislative
history and policies underlying the EAJA. Id. at 1112-15. That legislative history is not inconsistent
with analogy interpretation of section 2412(b) esp6used by Premachandra I. See supra notes 145-58
and accompanying text.
180. Premachandral, 727 F.2d at 730 (limiting the scope of § 2412(b) by the holding in First Nat'l
Bank v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 636 F.2d 195, 198-99 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042
(1981), that § 1983 provides a cause of action only for statutory violations which are akin to constitu-
tional claims). Other circuits have not similarly restricted the scope of § 1983 actions; the Ninth Circuit
explicitly rejected this limitation in Lauritzen v. Lehman, 736 F2d 550, 557 n.8 (9th Cir. 1984).
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automatically ensues. In construing section 2412(b), Premachandra I lost
sight of the distinction between the terms of the referenced statute, section
1988, and those of section 2412(b). The court mistook the virtually
mandatory fee award to a prevailing plaintiff under section 1988181 for a
virtually mandatory fee award pursuant to section 2412(b). 182 If Congress
had intended section 2412(b) fee awards to be predicated totally on the
terms of the referenced statute, it would have said so. 183 Congress chose
"may" rather than "shall" in section 2412(b), and the courts should utilize
the discretion Congress intended them to have. The courts should articulate
standards of sufficient generality to apply to virtually all cases involving
section 2412(b) and a particular fee-shifting statute.
The judicial rule for attorneys' fees claims under sections 2412(b) and
1988 should retain the balance between sections 2412(b) and 2412(d)
originally struck by Congress by setting a fair limit on the scope of section
2412(b). Section 2412(b) statutory fee awards should encompass only
those section 1988 claims resulting from the vindication of constitutional
rights and fundamental personal rights similar to those protected by the
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments. Thus, if the United States
commits an act involving constitutional or fundamental personal rights
which would incur liability had the same act been committed by another
party or which actually violates an enumerated provision of section 1988,
the United States would be liable under section 2412(b). The major effect
of this rule would be to limit any potential flood of section 2412(b) claims
based on the statutory prong of section 1983. If the substantive claim is one
for which section 1983 provides a right of action when "color of state law"
is satisfied, but which does not involve fundamental rights, attorneys' fees
would not be awarded pursuant to section 2412(b). Parties prevailing in a
broad range of federal regulatory litigation generally would not be entitled
to a section 2412(b) fee award. 184 They could claim section 2412(d) fee
awards subject to its restrictions. Plaintiffs requesting fees for actions to
enforce constitutional or fundamental personal statutory rights, however,
would be eligible for section 2412(b) awards. 185
181. See supra note 29.
182. Premnachandra 11, 753 F.2d at 639 n.3 ("If subsection (b) applies, the court must invoke
section 1988, which means fees are awarded unless special circumstances would make the result
unjust. ").
183. When Congress intended a nondiscretionary fee award, it so indicated by using the word
"shall." 5 U.S.C. § 504, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982).
184. See Premachandra I, 753 F.2d at 643 (Gibson, J., dissenting); supplementary brief of
plaintiff-appellee Dr. Bhartur N. Premachandra for rehearing en banc, at 3-5, Premachandra v. Mitts
(Premachandra 11), 753 E2d 635 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
185. E.g., Trujillo v. Heckler (Trujillo 1), 587 F. Supp. 928, 932 (D. Colo. 1984) (alleging statutory
violations which were found to be akin to violations of fundamental rights), appeal docketed, No.
84-2104 (10th Cir. Aug. 7, 1984).
242
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In addition, the specific language of section 2412(b) sets limits on
potential fee awards, independent of the terms of any referenced fee-
shifting statute. This limitation is required because there is no indication in
the EAJA or its legislative history that referenced statutes are intended to
enlarge or override the fee authorization in section 2412(b). 186 By its terms,
section 2412(b) only authorizes fees against the United States in a civil
action, 187 even though a hypothetical referenced fee-shifting statute could
award fees to the prevailing party in any civil or criminal action. 188 Finally,
the discretionary language of section 2412(b) permits a court to refuse to
grant an award because the circumstances of the case render an award
"unjust. 189 This degree of discretion insures that the adoption of a general
rule for interpreting section 2412(b) in relation to a referenced statute does
not conflict with the demands of justice in unusual factual situations.
In short, interpretation and application of section 2412(b) require a
fulfillment of the terms of both the referenced fee-shifting provision and
section 2412(b). Section 2412(b) fee awards are proper only within the
limits imposed by its language.
186. When Congress wished to resolve potential conflicts between § 2412(d) and other fee-
shifting statutes in favor of those other statutes, it clearly expressed its intent. See H.R. REP., supra note
12, at 18.
187. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982).
188. As a second example, § 2412(b) provides for fees only in judicial actions, but a referenced
fee-shifting statute might permit fee awards in administrative hearings. The Supreme Court recently
resolved such a conflict between §§ 2412(b) and 1988. See Webb v. Board of Educ., 105 S. Ct. 1923,
1928 (1985) (holding that § 1988 fee awards do not cover administrative hearings held in connection
with § 1983 actions because § 1983 does not require such proceedings). The analysis of this issue in
Trujillo v. Heckler (Trujillo II), 596 F. Supp. 396, 400 (D. Colo. 1984) (dicta), nevertheless, is
instructive of the difficulties courts can create if they fail to heed the restrictive terms of § 2412(b).
Trujillo 11 suggested that an action for attorneys' fees based on §§ 2412(b) and 1988 may support fee
awards for administrative as well as judicial proceedings. Id. Such an extension of Premachandra I
conflicts with the language of § 2412(b) and threatens the structure of the EAJA.
Section 2412(b) authorizes fee awards only in a "civil action." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982). It is not
as expansiveas § 1988, which authorizes fees in "any action orproceeding." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(1982);
see, e.g., Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d511,525 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that § 1988 authorized
fee awards for administrative actions). Moreover, § 2412 is contained within the portion of the EAJA
entitled "Award of Fees and Other Expenses in Certain Judicial Proceedings." See supra note 1. The
EAJA authorizes fee awards in agency actions in a separate section and permits those awards only in
adversary adjudications in which the position of the United States is not substantially justified. See 5
U.S.C. § 504(1982). Fee awards forjudicial review of such adjudications "may be made only pursuant
to section 2412(d)(3) .... " (emphasis supplied). Id. Fees awarded for an administrative hearing
pursuant to § 2412(b) and a referenced fee-shifting provision would not be subject to these require-
ments. The Trujillo 1I approach thus could create an impermissible "end run" of the language,
structure, and legislative history of the Act. See H.R. RFP., supra note 12, at 14.




The interpretive puzzle of section 2412(b) stems from Congress' use of
opaque language, coupled with its failure to express clearly the intended
scope of section 2412(b). By a careful reading of the statute and an
openminded inquiry into its legal context, however, courts can reach an
interpretation of section 2412(b) that gives due weight to all parts of the text
and is consistent with the stated remedial purpose of the EAJA.
A careful reading of section 2412(b) clarifies its opaque language. The
textual analysis shows that the subsection imposes liability on the United
States when it commits an act which would create liability in any other
party. This interpretation comports with the liberal constructions that have
been accorded similarly worded waivers of sovereign immunity. It gives
effect to all the language of section 2412(b) and preserves a viable role for
the subsection within the EAJA.
To maintain the intended balance between sections 2412(b) and 2412(d)
of the EAJA, the courts should utilize the discretion granted them by
Congress to limit section 2412(b) awards. In the case of section 2412(b)
attorneys' fees claims based on section 1988, they should restrict awards to
cases where the underlying action implicated constitutional or important
personal rights. More generally, in resolving section 2412(b) claims based
on any federal fee-shifting provisions, courts should require fulfillment of
both the terms of the referenced statute and any restrictive terms in section
2412(b).
Arlene S. Ragozin
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